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Financial intermediaries—such as banks, savings and 
loan institutions, and insurance companies—play a 
large and significant role in highly developed econo-
mies. In the United States, for example, the finance, 
insurance, and real estate sector accounted for about 
15 percent of the real gross national product in 1986. 
The comparable figure for agriculture, forestry, and 
fisheries was less than 3 percent and for manufacturing, 
nearly 22 percent.
1 The economic significance of 
financial intermediaries results from their special role: 
making contractual arrangements that link borrowers 
and lenders more efficiently than if these agents had to 
trade directly. 
Despite the size and significance of the intermedia-
tion sector, only recently have economists attempted to 
build models explicit enough to address such basic 
questions as 
• Why do intermediaries exist? 
• What makes them special? 
• How do they interact with the rest of the economy? 
In this paper I use recent advances in the theory of 
financial intermediation to construct a model that can 
address these questions. In this model, financial inter-
mediaries arise endogenously in equilibrium: interme-
diaries exist because they economize on the costs of 
monitoring borrowers in a world where relevant infor-
mation about specific borrowers is not freely available 
to lenders. The intermediaries of the model perform 
special functions similar to those performed by real-
world intermediaries: they borrow from and lend to a 
large number of economic agents, they process infor-
mation about investment outcomes, they issue liabil-
ities with characteristics different from their assets, and 
they write debt contracts. 
Having constructed the model, I then give an 
example of how it can be used to tell us more about 
business cycle phenomena and about the interplay 
between financial intermediation and the macroecon-
omy. The example shows how endogenous changes in 
the costs of intermediation can amplify business cycle 
fluctuations. The example also illustrates how this 
model can reproduce—as other business cycle models 
cannot—observed qualitative comovements between 
aggregate bankruptcies and other economic time 
series. In addition, the model predicts timing patterns 
between a nominal monetary aggregate and real output-
patterns consistent with empirical observation. 
Before presenting the model in detail, I briefly 
review developments in the theory of financial inter-
mediation. This review allows us to place the model 
within the context of other approaches—old and new— 
to modeling intermediation. 
Approaches to Modeling Intermediation 
Newer approaches to modeling financial intermedia-
tion can be viewed as reactions to older micro- and 
1 These percentages are based on data from the Commerce Department's 
Survey of Current Business, July 1987, p. 57, Table 6.2. 
19 macroeconomic approaches to the problem. Compared 
with older micro approaches, recent theories of inter-
mediation are much more explicit about what makes 
intermediaries special. Compared with older macro 
approaches, recent theories tend to be less concerned 
with the role of money in intermediation. 
Toward Greater Explicitness 
In studying the microeconomic behavior of financial 
intermediaries, older approaches simply assumed the 
existence of intermediary firms. (See Baltensperger 
1980 for a survey of the older literature.) For example, 
if we were to follow such an approach in modeling a 
bank, we would start by specifying a technology for 
producing outputs (different types of loans) from inputs 
(different types of deposits). As a result, a bank ends up 
looking much like any other firm; little in this approach 
distinguishes banking from, say, the production of 
toothbrushes. But what makes financial intermediation 
potentially worthy of study are its special functions 
(such as diversification, information processing, and 
asset transformation). We cannot expect to generate 
these special activities or derive many useful implica-
tions if our approach does not build on the economic 
features that cause financial intermediaries to arise in 
the first place. 
More recent work on the theory of financial inter-
mediation generally follows the route of first specifying 
an explicit economic environment (economic agents' 
preferences, their endowments, and the technology 
available to them), next showing that financial inter-
mediation is a necessary element of an equilibrium in 
that environment, and then studying the features of the 
equilibrium. The environments in these models con-
tain some sort of private information; that is, some 
economic agents know more about their own activities, 
preferences, endowments, or production technologies 
than do other agents. 
One group of newer financial intermediation 
models, which I call Type 1, focuses specifically on 
banking, deposit contracts, and bank runs. Type 1 
models attempt to rigorously justify the conventional 
wisdom that views banking as inherently unstable (and 
therefore as requiring special regulatory intervention). 
Of these models, the most well known is Diamond and 
Dybvig's (1983). (For related work, see Haubrich and 
King 1983, Smith 1984, Chari and Jagannathan 1987, 
and Bhattacharya and Gale 1987.) 
In the Diamond-Dybvig model, banks provide in-
surance against an uncertain demand for liquidity. 
However, for any demand deposit contract supplying 
such insurance, a bad equilibrium exists where all 
agents run to the bank to withdraw their deposits; as a 
result, production is disrupted. In their model, this 
situation can be improved in some circumstances if the 
bank suspends withdrawals and in others if the gov-
ernment provides deposit insurance. Thus, Diamond 
and Dybvig construct an explicit environment where 
banking is in some sense essential, show what problems 
can develop, and evaluate the results of particular 
government interventions. Although their results about 
policy interventions are subject to debate (see, for 
example, Williamson, forthcoming b), the explicit 
nature of the approach makes it more likely that the 
debate will be conducted at a fruitful level. 
In a second group of recent models, which I call 
Type 2, financial intermediation serves to economize on 
the costs of acquiring information. (It is this type of 
model that I present later in the paper.) Type 2 models 
focus on more general kinds of intermediary structures, 
rather than on banking in particular. An important 
example of this type appears in Boyd and Prescott 
1986. In that paper, the intermediaries that arise are 
organizations which write sets of rules for compensat-
ing intermediary members (residual claimants) and 
nonmembers (depositors and borrowers) and for evalu-
ating and funding borrowers' investment projects. In 
this way, the costly evaluation of investment projects 
and their funding occur more efficiently than if proj-
ects were evaluated and funded through decentralized 
markets. 
In another Type 2 model (Diamond 1984), bor-
rowers know more about the realized outcomes of their 
investment projects than do lenders. An arrangement 
with a diversified financial intermediary permits indi-
vidual lenders to delegate the responsibility for moni-
toring borrowers to the intermediary and thereby to 
economize on the costs of monitoring investment 
outcomes. A similar delegated monitoring role for inter-
mediaries is presented in Williamson 1986, which 
builds on the costly state verification approach in 
Townsend 1979. In Williamson's model, the contrac-
tual arrangements between intermediaries and their 
borrowers capture elements of those observed in the 
real world; that is, intermediaries write debt contracts 
and in some circumstances may ration credit. 
Away From Money 
In traditional macroeconomic approaches, financial 
intermediation has been regarded as important only 
because some intermediaries produce money. This 
view is reflected in the content of undergraduate money 
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and banking courses, where banking is introduced into 
the study of macroeconomic issues by examining the 
money multiplier process (by which an increase in base 
money gets multiplied by a fractional-reserve banking 
system). The idea that intermediation does not merit 
study by macroeconomists unless the intermediary in 
question issues liabilities having the characteristics of 
money is consistent with the monetarist views of Milton 
Friedman. (See, for example, Friedman 1960, 1969; 
Friedman and Schwartz 1963.) 
Particularly illustrative of the monetarist approach is 
Friedman and Schwartz's (1963) interpretation of how 
bank failures contributed to the severity of the Great 
Depression. They argued that an increase in the inci-
dence of bank failures caused the public to prefer 
holding currency rather than bank deposits. The money 
multiplier thus fell and, since the Federal Reserve did 
not conduct offsetting open market operations, the 
money supply dropped. According to Friedman and 
Schwartz, what mattered for the pace of economic 
activity was not the direct effects of the bank failures, 
but the fact that the money supply dropped. That is, in 
their analysis, the intermediation process itself is ir-
relevant for aggregate activity; what is relevant is how 
disturbances to the system affect monetary assets. 
In the newer approaches to studying financial inter-
mediation, the monetary nature of an intermediary's 
liabilities is of little consequence. For example, in the 
Diamond-Dybvig model cited earlier (Diamond and 
Dybvig 1983), bank runs arise in an environment in 
which there is no asset that could be identified as 
money. (Also, for the model presented later in this 
paper, it matters little that intermediary deposits are in 
some ways similar to currency.) 
This element of the newer approaches was fore-
shadowed in some of James Tobin's writings (Tobin 
1961, 1963; Tobin and Brainard 1963). However, his 
treatment of the intermediation process in macro-
economic analysis (for example, Tobin 1969) paral-
leled the earlier microeconomic studies of intermediary 
firm behavior, mentioned previously. That is, the exis-
tence of intermediaries is simply assumed, and their 
behavior is treated as identical to that of other 
economic agents. In Tobin's analysis, an intermediary is 
specified in terms of its assets and liabilities, ad hoc 
supply and demand functions for each of these assets 
and liabilities, and a balance sheet constraint. Since this 
analysis does not address the fundamentals of what 
makes financial intermediaries special, it cannot en-
lighten us much about the role intermediation plays in 
macroeconomic activity. 
The approach to macroeconomics embodied in 
modern equilibrium business cycle theory virtually 
ignores financial intermediation. The monetary theory 
of the business cycle presented in Lucas 1972, and later 
popularized in Barro 1976, is consistent with 
Friedman's monetarist view that intermediation is 
unimportant. The real business cycle models of 
Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Long and Plosser 
(1983) go even further by abstracting from monetary 
factors as well as financial intermediation. (For an 
update on Kydland-Prescott, see also Prescott 1986.) 
This approach leaves observed money-output correla-
tions unexplained, but King and Plosser (1984) have 
indicated how these correlations might be reproduced 
in a real business cycle model, due to the endogenous 
response of the banking sector to real disturbances. 
However, their model treats banking symmetrically 
with other types of economic activity, with inter-
mediaries performing only one essential function, the 
production of transaction services. 
A Dynamic General Equilibrium Model 
With Financial Intermediation 
Having reviewed some theoretical trends, I now con-
struct a Type 2 dynamic general equilibrium model of 
financial intermediation. Although the model re-
sembles one in an earlier paper (Williamson, forth-
coming a), it has been simplified to make my main 
points more accessible. The model illustrates how 
newer approaches capture the special functions of real-
world intermediaries in explicitly specified economic 
environments. And by embedding the model in a 
dynamic framework, I show how such an approach can 
be used to confront macroeconomic issues. 
The model's fundamental structure is that of an 
overlapping generations (OLG) model with borrowing 
and lending, and is similar to OLG models used by 
Wallace (1980) and Sargent and Wallace (1982). 
However, it differs from theirs in that, in equilibrium, 
one-period borrowing and lending is carried out 
through an intermediary structure, rather than by 
borrowers and lenders directly. The OLG apparatus is 
particularly convenient in this instance, since it easily 
accommodates a Type 2 financial intermediation 
model (resembling the one in Williamson 1986) within 
a dynamic framework. The model economy's inhabi-
tants and their behavior are now described. 
Lenders and Entrepreneurs 
In each period t} where t= 1,2,3,..., there are N agents 
born, each of whom lives for two periods. A fraction a 
21 of these agents are lenders and the remainder (1 —a) are 
entrepreneurs. Lenders born at time t are each endowed 
with e units of the time t consumption good in the first 
period of life. These lenders consume at t and at t + 1 
and maximize expected utility over their lifetime. That 
is, each lender maximizes 
(1) £,(ln ct + ch-i) 
where Et is the expectation operator conditioned on 
time t information, ct is consumption in period t} and the 
lender's utility function is 
(2) f(ct, cf+i) = lnc, + cf+1. 
To consume in the second period of life, lenders either 
acquire fiat money in the first period or exchange their 
endowment for some claim to the second period's 
consumption good. The nature of these claims is 
determined in what follows. 
At t — 1, a group of old lenders are collectively 
endowed with //units of fiat money. These lenders sell 
all this endowment of money so as to maximize 
consumption at t— 1. 
Entrepreneurs born at time t receive no endowment 
in either period of life and maximize Etct+ Each 
entrepreneur has access to an investment project that 
needs K units of the consumption good to operate. 
Because /Cis assumed to be much larger than e; it takes 
the endowments of a large number of lenders to finance 
the investment project of a single entrepreneur. If an 
investment project is funded at time t, it is either 
successful with probability 7r, yielding a return of wt at 
t+ 1, or unsuccessful with probability 1 — 7r, giving a 
return of zero, where 0 < n < 1. Entrepreneurs' returns 
are independently distributed, and entrepreneurs in a 
given generation have different 7r values. Thus, each 
entrepreneur has a name; or 7r value, and entrepreneurs' 
names in a given generation are uniformly distributed 
over the interval [7r
lt, 7r?]. Mean project returns are 
therefore uniformly distributed over the interval 
[7T
ltWh 7T?W,]. 
If a given project is funded in period t} only the 
entrepreneur who operates it can observe its return 
without incurring some cost. Any other agent can 
observe the return, but in doing so incurs a monitoring 
cost of p units of the consumption good. Thus, there is 
costly state verification (as in Townsend 1979). That is, 
it is costly for others to learn about the success or failure 
of a particular venture, but costless for the entrepreneur 
who actually operates the project (though all are 
equally informed before the project is funded about its 
potential payoffs and likelihood of success). 
At the beginning of time t, agents know all details of 
the time t environment, but there is uncertainty about 
the returns to lending and to holding fiat money. Given 
that all agents are risk neutral [note that the utility of 
entrepreneurs is linear in c,+1, as is that of lenders in 
equation (1)], all that is relevant for lenders' saving 
decisions is the highest available expected return on 
assets. In equilibrium, all assets held, including fiat 
money, bear the same expected return rt. That is, 
(3) rt = (Etpt+\)/pt 
where pt is the price of fiat money in terms of the 
consumption good (and 1 //?, is the price level). If st is a 
lender's saving, then from (1) and assuming that st > 0, 
utility maximization implies 
(4) st = e-(pt/Etpt+{). 
That is, lenders will save more if expected returns are 
high and less if expected returns are low. 
If entrepreneurs in this environment were patho-
logically honest (they never lie, even if it were in their 
interest to do so), then there would be no need for 
monitoring investment outcomes, and the problem 
would be uninteresting. However, agents in the model 
are assumed to be rational (attentive to their own 
interests). Thus, without monitoring, an entrepreneur 
whose project was funded at time t and was successful 
would adopt the following utility-maximizing strategy: 
report at t + 1 that the project was unsuccessful and 
then consume the entire return. In this situation we have 
what is known as a moral hazard problem. That is, the 
actions of an entrepreneur may affect the lenders' 
payoffs. Knowing this, lenders would not fund any 
projects if monitoring never occurred. Therefore, for 
projects to be funded, contracts must be written to 
provide for monitoring under some contingencies. They 
will be written in a way that gives entrepreneurs the 
incentive to truthfully report returns while allowing 
lenders to economize on monitoring costs. 
Suppose that m lenders, indexed byy = 1,2,..., m, 
fund a particular entrepreneur's project in period t. 
Payments can be made to these lenders in t + 1 only 
if the project is successful. Let Xj denote the payment 
to lender j if the project is successful, where total 
payments cannot exceed the entrepreneur's return 
(Sjcj < wt). Also assume that a given lender cannot 
observe what the entrepreneur pays the other lenders. 
22 Stephen D. Williamson 
Modeling Financial Intermediation 
At t + 1 the entrepreneur can make either of two 
declarations: the project succeeded or the project failed. 
At least one of these declarations must induce lender j 
to monitor, since otherwise the entrepreneur would 
always declare failure.
2 Clearly, a lender's optimal 
strategy is to monitor only if the entrepreneur declares 
the project failed.
3 Given this monitoring strategy, the 
entrepreneur always reports the true outcome to all 
lenders. 
The total expected return to all m lenders, when each 
lends directly to the entrepreneur, is the expected value 
of total payments minus expected monitoring costs; 
that is, 
m 
(5) = 7T S xj - (1—7r)/?m. 
The expected return to the entrepreneur is the expected 
project return minus expected payments to the lenders, 
or 
m 
(6) /?< = 7T (W-X Xj). 
It seems clear that there must be a way to improve on 
this arrangement, since in the case of a bad outcome all 
lenders monitor and acquire the same information. 
Suppose, then, that the group of m lenders delegates the 
task of monitoring to one group member. If this 
monitoring agent always reports the true outcome to 
the group, the entrepreneur could receive an expected 
return of R
l0, as in (6), while the group of lenders gets 
expected returns higher than in (5): 
m 
(7) R[ = 7T X Xj - (1-7r)j8 > R
l0. 
However, the moral hazard problem crops up again 
because the monitoring agent does not have an incen-
tive to report the truth. If the project succeeds, the 
monitoring agent could declare the outcome was bad 
and collude with the entrepreneur to split the payments 
that would have gone to the other lenders. Therefore, 
this arrangement does not work. 
Intermediaries 
An arrangement that optimally delegates the monitor-
ing role does exist, however, and it shares most of the 
special functions associated with financial intermedia-
tion. In this arrangement, the financial intermediary is 
an individual lender (a monitoring agent) who lends to 
many entrepreneurs and borrows from many lenders. 
By lending to and borrowing from many agents, the 
intermediary exploits the law of large numbers. (As an 
example of this law, take the case of coin tosses. If we 
flipped a fair coin for a large enough number of times, 
then the fraction of flips that were heads would be 
arbitrarily close to one-half.) Thus a financial inter-
mediary in this model can perfectly predict the fractions 
of entrepreneurs with good and bad outcomes. The 
intermediary can therefore commit to making fixed 
payments to its depositors (lenders), but without 
making the payments hinge on the outcomes of 
entrepreneurs' projects.
4 In equilibrium, each depositor 
receives a certain return at t + 1 of rt per unit deposit-
ed in period t. Because free entry into intermediation 
implies that no profit opportunities remain unexploited 
in equilibrium, intermediaries earn zero profits. Thus, 
an entrepreneur with probability tv of a good outcome 
makes a payment vt(ir) to the financial intermediary in 
the event of a good outcome. This payment is set to give 
the intermediary an expected return of rtK on the loan. 
That is, 
(8) Trvt(ir) — (1—7t))8 = rtK. 
Also, the entrepreneur's payment cannot exceed the 
project's return: 
(9) v,(Tr) < w,. 
Thus, under this optimal arrangement, all monitoring is 
delegated to the intermediary, and depositors need 
never incur any costs in verifying outcomes. 
The financial intermediaries modeled here perform 
several of the special functions that characterize real-
world intermediaries: 
• Intermediaries borrow from and lend to large 
numbers of economic agents. Here, this diversifi-
cation is critical to the functions performed by an 
intermediary, since it gives the intermediary the 
correct incentives as a monitoring agent and 
eliminates the moral hazard problem. 
21 rule out stochastic monitoring by assumption. With stochastic monitor-
ing, monitoring would occur with some prespecified probability, where this 
probability depends on the entrepreneur's particular declaration. This doesn't 
matter much for the analysis here, but it would make the equilibrium contract 
more complicated. 
3 For the purpose of this argument, I assume that each of the m lenders has 
access to enough of the consumption good (by holding some fiat money) in t + 1 
to cover the cost of monitoring. This assumption, however, is irrelevant for the 
analysis that follows. 
4TO be more precise, it is sufficient for this result to let the number of 
borrowers n grow large while the number of intermediaries k grows large, 
where k = n
6 and 0 < 8 <7. 
23 • The characteristics of assets held by intermediaries 
differ from those of their liabilities. Here, inter-
mediary assets are loans, each of which pays off 
only in the event of a good outcome for the 
entrepreneur. Deposits are noncontingent liabili-
ties that pay a fixed amount regardless of project 
outcomes. 
• Financial intermediaries process information. Here, 
an intermediary obtains information in monitoring 
its borrowers, and its depositors need not concern 
themselves about monitoring. 
• Financial intermediaries, particularly banks, tend to 
rely on debt instruments in writing contracts with 
their borrowers. Here, intermediary assets have 
several features associated with debt: a borrower 
makes a fixed payment for good outcomes and 
consumes zero (is bankrupt) in the event of a bad 
outcome. The monitoring cost fi can be interpreted 
as a cost of bankruptcy. Debt contracts can also be 
obtained with more general probability distribu-
tions for the project return. The general result is 
that the entrepreneur consumes the project return 
minus a fixed payment when there is no monitor-




Given the expected return on assets rt, it is generally the 
case, from equations (8) and (9), that some entre-
preneurs will not receive loans. That is, even if such an 
entrepreneur had received a loan and paid wt with 
a good outcome, the expected payment to the inter-
mediary would be less than rtK. Entrepreneurs not 
receiving loans are those with a low probability of 
success and a high expected cost of monitoring. Given 
(8) and (9), we can determine the cutoff point for 
lending by intermediaries. That is, there is some point 
7r* such that entrepreneurs with tt > n* get loans and 
those with tt < tt* do not. From (8) and (9) we get 
(10) tr* = (rtK+P)/(wt+P). 
Given equation (10), the quantity of loans made by 
intermediaries is 
(11) Lt = (l-a)NK(7T
ut-7r*t)/(7Tf-7rl). 
The stock of fiat money is fixed for all t, with //units 
issued to old lenders at t— 1. In equilibrium, lenders 
save by holding fiat money or deposits with inter-
mediaries. Therefore, since deposits are equal to loans, 
(12) aNSt = ptH + Lt. 
It remains to describe the nature of the stochastic 
disturbances that will drive the business cycle in the 
model. Attention will be confined to disturbances affect-
ing investment technologies, that is, to shocks affecting 
the success probabilities and returns of projects.
6 Thus, 
given a specification of how 7r/, tt
1}, and wt evolve, 
equations (4), (10), (11), and (12) can be used to 
determine a rational expectations solution for the 
evolution of pt, Lt, tt*, and st. A simple and tractable 
formulation is to assume that the state of the world, 
denoted by zt, follows a two-state Markov process. That 
is, zt equals either zx or z2, and the future evolution of 
zt depends only on its current value. We thus have 
(13) Pr[zt+l=zl\zt=zi]
 = qi 
where qt is the probability of getting state 1 in the next 
period, given that the current state is i; 0 < qt < 1; 
i = 1, 2; and q\ > q^. Therefore, the probability of 
getting the same state in consecutive periods is higher 
than that of getting different states (that is, zt is posi-
tively serially correlated). If zt = zif then ir\ — tt\, 
— 7r
ui, wt = wh for i= 1, 2. A rational expectations 
equilibrium is then (pif Lif 7r*, st) for i— 1,2, where 
(pt, Lt, 7rl st) = (pi, Lh 7T/, s^ if zt = z/. That is, variables 
depend only on the state of the world in equilibrium. 
Thus, from (13), we have 
(14) £,[/?,+! | z,=zj = qtpx + (l-qi)p2. 
Therefore, substituting using (4), (10), and (11) in (12) 






5 Unfortunately, allowing for risk aversion or stochastic monitoring or both 
generally results in a contract that does not have these simple features (see 
Townsend 1987). 
6Using this model, it would be straightforward to examine an equilibrium 
with shocks to the quantity of fiat money. But I choose to focus here on 
technology shocks because this helps relate the approach to the real business 
cycle literature and better illustrates what we can learn from the approach. 
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In principle, (15) and (16) solve for p{ and p2, and (4), 
(10), and (11) then solve for st, tt*, and Lt. In addition, 
output at t+ 1, denoted yt+\, is the sum of output 
produced from projects financed in period t and the 
endowments of lenders in period t+ 1, or 
(17) ym = [(l-a)W0r?-w/)] 
X /.'' [ ww—(I - n)P]dn + aNe.  771 
Let bt+\ denote the number of bankruptcies at t + 1 
(that is, projects financed at t that get a bad outcome). 
Then 
(18) bt+l = [(l-a)W(7r? - tt/)]/?(l-ir)Ar.  nt 
An Example of the Model at Work 
I now present a numerical example that illustrates some 
of the model's properties and allows me to make my 
main points. For the example, parameter values (listed 
in Table 1) were chosen to produce fluctuations in 
output on the order of what might be observed in the 
real world and to ensure that lenders hold a relatively 
small part of their wealth as currency. Also, the shocks 
to investment project returns and success probabili-
Table 1 
Parameter Values for the Example 
Variable  Value  Variable  Value 
N  1,000,000  .7 
a  .98  .08 
e  2  400 
H  1  w2  514 
K  50  <7,  .6 
<  .9  <72  .4 
.1 
ties were set up so that tty w{ = w2 and 7r( w{ = tt{w2. 
That is, whether zt = 1 or zt — 2, mean project returns 
are uniformly distributed over the same interval. The 
technology shocks thus do not affect production oppor-
tunities in terms of mean returns, but they do affect the 
riskiness of each entrepreneur's project. For example, if 
we use variance o
2 as a measure of the riskiness of an 
investment project with an expected return R, then 
a
2 = wtR — /?
2, and risk increases as wt increases. 
Results 
An equilibrium was computed for each of three values 
for monitoring costs: p = 0,40, and 80. The results are 
presented in Table 2. (Note that in the table, yt and bt 
are the level of output and the number of bankruptcies 
when zt-{= i. Also, y, is the fraction of entrepreneurs 
who receive loans when zt = i. Shading indicates pos-
itive monitoring costs.) 
For the case where monitoring costs are zero (P = 0), 
note that no fluctuations occur.
7 That is, since all agents 
are risk neutral and stochastic disturbances do not 
affect mean returns, production opportunities do not 
vary across states of the world when project returns can 
be verified without cost. In contrast, for the cases where 
monitoring is costly (P = 40 and P = 80), prices and 
quantities fluctuate. Note also that if p = 0, then 
financial intermediation is inessential; borrowing and 
lending could be carried out through direct transactions 
between lenders and entrepreneurs. Thus, the ability of 
the model to produce fluctuations in response to shocks 
to the riskiness of investment project technologies is 
integrally related to the role for financial intermedia-
tion which arises here. 
When monitoring costs are positive, fluctuations 
occur in the following manner. When the state of the 
world changes from 1 to 2, the primary effect of this 
disturbance is an increase in the average entrepreneur's 
probability of experiencing a bad outcome. Since 
monitoring occurs only if a project fails, the higher 
average probability of a bad outcome increases the 
expected cost of monitoring for the average borrower 
and thus increases the average cost of financial inter-
mediation. Therefore, fewer loans are made in state 2 
than in state 1 (L2 < Lx), and the demand for fiat money 
is higher in state 2, resulting in a higher price of fiat 
money (p2 >p\) and thus a lower price level. Output is 
7 When (3 = 0, the cutoff point for lending to entrepreneurs 7r* fluctuates 
(as seen in Table 2). However, the size and characteristics of the group of 
entrepreneurs who receive loans are identical in states 1 and 2. 
25 Table 2 
Equilibria Computed for Different Monitoring Costs 
Monitoring Costs* 
Variable 
(subscripts denote state)  >8 = 0  £ = 40  0 = 80 
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'Shading indicates positive monitoring costs; the darker the shade, the higher the costs. 
lower in period t if zt-\ = 2 than if zt-\— 1, since fewer 
investment projects are funded at t — 1 in the first case. 
When monitoring costs are positive, the number of 
bankruptcies is affected in three different ways. First, 
given the nature of technological disturbances, the 
average probability of bankruptcy is higher if zt — 2 
than if zt — 1; when zt — 2, the number of bankruptcies 
tends to be higher at t+ 1. Second, fewer projects are 
funded if zt = 2 (yx > y2), and this tends to make the 
number of bankruptcies lower at t + 1. Third, projects 
with a given mean return which go unfunded if zt = 2 
but which would be funded if zt— 1 are those with the 
highest probability of going bankrupt among projects 
which get loans in state 1. That is, the marginal projects 
that get filtered out when zt = 2 are the most likely to go 
bankrupt. This third effect tends to make the number of 
bankruptcies higher at t+ 1 if zt— 1 than if zt = 2. 
However, the first effect more than offsets the last two, 
so that b2 > b\. 
Interpretations and Insights 
A benefit of this explicit approach to modeling financial 
intermediation is the insight gained about the inter-
action between production technologies and the inter-
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mediation process. In the example, the business cycle 
arises due to the effect of technology shocks on the costs 
of intermediation. That is, an increase in the probability 
of a bad return for all entrepreneurs, if mean returns are 
held constant, increases the magnitude of the incentive 
problem, since there is a higher probability that an 
intermediary must monitor a particular entrepreneur. 
Note that doubling the size of the monitoring cost from 
40 to 80 magnifies fluctuations, as shown in Table 3. 
Therefore, the more important financial intermediation 
is in saving on resource costs (the higher p is), the 
greater the magnitude of fluctuations produced as the 
result of disturbances to project risk.
8 
Note that the monetary nature of an intermediary's 
liabilities is irrelevant to most of the analysis here. In 
contrast to the monetarist view of intermediation dis-
cussed earlier, it does not particularly matter for the role 
played by intermediaries that the deposits they issue 
might appear similar in some respects to fiat money. 
For the most part, the business cycles generated by 
the model for the cases P = 40 and = 80 fit the 
stylized facts of macroeconomic behavior. Note that 
since there is some persistence in the technology 
shocks (that is, zt = i tends to be followed by z,+1 = i, 
for i = 1, 2), there will also be persistence in output. 
Therefore, high output tends to be associated with a 
high quantity of loans and a low number of bankrupt-
cies, as we observe in time series data. Also, prices tend 
to be high when output is high.
9 
The model also generates predictions about timing 
patterns among economic time series. For example, 
suppose we were to aggregate fiat money and inter-
mediary deposits and call the sum (in nominal terms) 
money, denoted by Mt. We then have 
(19) Mt = aNst/pt. 
If we compute the equilibrium values for money in this 
example as in Table 2, we get the following results: 
Variable  P = 40  £ = 80 
M{  8.68910  4.95152 
M2  8.60790  4.84648 
Thus, periods with low real output are always preceded 
by periods with low nominal money. If we ran this 
model to generate long time series of money and output 
(as shown in Williamson, forthcoming a), we would find 
Table 3 
Higher Monitoring Costs Magnify 
Business Cycle Fluctuations 
(coefficients of variation*) 
Monitoring Costs** 
Variable  p = 40 p = 80 
Price of Fiat Money (pt)  .0026 .0059 
Total Loans (Lt)  .0027 .0075 
Output (y/+1)  .0083 .0174 
Bankruptcies (/)M)  .1167 .1250 
'Coefficients of variation have been computed unconditionally. 
"Darker shading for higher monitoring costs. 
that in the statistical sense, money causes output. That 
is, upward movements in money tend to precede 
upward movements in output. However, this statistical 
relationship tells us nothing about the effects of changes 
in the stock of outside money on output. For example, a 
one-time unanticipated change in the quantity of fiat 
money, accomplished through transfers to old agents, 
would be neutral; it would increase the price level 
proportionally with no effect on the real allocation. 
It should be noted that some of the time series 
correlations this model generates, such as the positive 
correlation between prices and output and the timing 
between money and output, could also be reproduced in 
models where financial intermediation is inessential. 
For example, the idea that observed money-output 
correlations can be explained by the endogenous 
response of inside money to exogenous disturbances is 
not new. This idea has been exposited in various forms 
by Tobin (1970), Sargent and Wallace (1982), King 
and Plosser (1984), and Freeman (1986)—all without 
the aid of an explicit model of financial intermediation. 
However, this model reproduces other phenomena that 
alternative models would have difficulty explaining, 
particularly the negative correlation between bankrupt-
cies and output. 
8It can be shown more generally, by using calculus, that an increase in p 
increases the size of fluctuations. 
9There is some debate as to how prices move over a typical business cycle; 
some, such as Lucas (1977), accept a positive correlation between the price 
level and output as a stylized fact, while Prescott (1983) finds a negative 
correlation in postwar detrended U.S. data. 
27 Concluding Remarks 
This paper has reviewed some recent advances in the 
theory of financial intermediation and then shown, 
by way of an example, what can be learned through 
the explicit modeling of financial intermediaries. 
The example shows how, in a business cycle driven by 
disturbances to the riskiness of investment projects, 
fluctuations are amplified as intermediaries' monitor-
ing costs increase. In the example, an interplay exists 
between production technologies and the intermedia-
tion sector; fluctuations result from the effects of 
technology shocks on intermediation costs. The 
example shows how the model can generate qualitative 
comovements, similar to those observed empirically, 
among aggregate time series. 
Due to its tractability, this model (or a more general 
one, such as presented in Williamson, forthcoming a), 
could be useful in examining other issues in macro-
economics. For instance, the model might lend insight 
into understanding particular historical events. Real 
business cycle models of the type studied by Prescott 
(1986) are capable of accurately reproducing the 
business cycle phenomena in postwar U.S. data, but 
such models have more difficulty explaining events like 
the Great Depression. Some authors, for example 
Bernanke (1983), argue that the severity of the 
Depression was in part due to a reduction in the pace of 
the credit allocation process. The analysis here is 
suggestive as to how this might have occurred, and 
Bernanke (1983) and Bernanke and Gertler (1986) 
have studied other possible mechanisms. Also, in 
principle, there seems to be no reason why the model 
couldn't be calibrated, as are the real business cycle 
models of Prescott (1986), to see how well it quantita-
tively replicates business cycle phenomena. 
Much remains to be done in the theory of financial 
intermediation. Current research topics include the 
study of long-term financial relationships and the 
modeling of economies where some financial con-
tractual arrangements involve intermediation while 
others do not. In addition, there are important unre-
solved questions concerning the role of government in 
the financial sector, and whether or not the special 
nature of financial intermediation implies market 
failures that special regulations could correct. 
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